English football culture is obsessed with 4-4-2 to its detriment

Why 4-4-2 is a bad formation: two illustrative case-studies 

A national magazine, Manchester United’s formation, perhaps a dish on your local Chinese menu: what do all these things have in common? ‘442’, or variations thereof, which is perhaps the ‘default’ formation for most football teams in England – it permeates English football culture to the point that publications are named after it, and you can hear commentators bleat that teams have “switched to 4-4-2” when attempting to turn games. However, it has numerous problems as a system. Formation is incredibly important, and it is a peculiar part of English footballing culture that a player’s individual will to succeed and determination is often casually valued over playing as a team or unit within a system. We can even see this in the lone forwards of 4-5-1, and the value of ‘graft’ and ‘determination’. The secret of the success of teams like Barcelona, or to contrast the feats of José Mourinho's Inter, are not these received notions: they are triumphs of systems.

4-4-2 does not guarantee failure: I would never say that. Formations are interesting because they face other formations – a system which will be perfect in one match will be blunted in another. There’s also the matter of poor performances rather than faults in the system, although it must be said that a good tactical system should exploit the strengths of the players at hand, and this is the role of the substitute.

However, 4-4-2 is often seen as the ‘default’ formation in football, or at least English football. Why is this? I believe we can highlight a few important reasons:

1) A long tradition as a formation

2) Each player has a clearly defined role – 2 forwards, 2 central-midfielders, 2 wingers/wide-midfielders, 2 full-backs and 2 centre-backs – it has a symmetry which depends on pairings. Some examples:

a.    Hard-working, strong, ungainly forwards like Emile Heskey function well in this sort of system, because they can be paired with a partner who possesses the virtues they can exploit or lack, for example Michael Owen. Heskey is a figure of fun in English football, and the efficacy of his role on the pitch is not the subject of this article, although a negative criticism can perhaps be taken from the analysis and its implications. Another example is Dwight Yorke and Andy Cole. The ‘strike partnership’ is a romanticised thing, and in 4-4-2 the forwards are isolated and separate. This is perhaps a symptom of the valuation of attack against defence.

b.   Similarly in midfield, a ball-winning player such as Roy Keane will be paired with an attacking midfielder or a playmaker such as Paul Scholes.

c.    A legacy of the basic 4-4-2 shape defensively is the ‘back four’ as a concept and unit: for now, the sweeper is rare and full backs tend to have defensive and offensive work demanded of them as a matter of course. Derided players such as Glen Johnson are rarely deployed in roles which may perhaps suit them, as this will break the ‘back four’. To give an extreme example, Gareth Bale has been converted from a full-back into a winger, which perhaps suits Bale’s talents, but that it preserves Tottenham’s usual shape cannot be ignored. There are questions of whether Bale would have been converted had he played in the same teams that similar players like Roberto Carlos and Daniel Alves.

3) It encourages relentless attack, a focus on wide players and graft in defending, commonly cited features of ‘the English game’.

What, then does 4-4-2 require, and why are these things risky or inadequate in my analysis? A useful way of approaching this is through a case-study approach. Both of the following are usually labelled as 4-4-1-1 formations – however, as I have outlined above, these are logical extensions of the strike partnership, and are variations on the theme which are not large enough to constitute terribly different systems. Both case studies have some significance, and are signs that 4-4-2 is used in big games by (British) managers.

Case study 1: Manchester City 1 – 0 Stoke City [FA Cup Final 2011]

In this case, the final score belies the course of the match. Manchester City played well, in a possessive formation which can probably called 4-2-3-1. However, the formation which Stoke City played directly contributed to the effectiveness of Roberto Mancini’s strategy. Both teams possess strong players with large frames, although Manchester City deployed more players capable of flair and passing, such as David Silva. The fitness of Stoke’s centre-back Robert Huth and their left winger Matthew Etherington was in doubt before the beginning of the match, but Tony Pulis opted for a first-team line-up in the hopes of matching Manchester City.

From kickoff, Stoke looked to press high up the pitch. This narrative soon changed, and they were pressed back into their own half for almost the entire game, which is why I have mapped their formation as such on the diagram. This is one of the largest weaknesses of 4-4-2, that it requires teams to push up the pitch. The deployment of Walters behind target-man Kenwynne Jones should have provided numbers in midfield, and had Stoke pushed up the pitch both teams would have had 3 players in the central zone of the pitch – this would have allowed Stoke’s full-backs to mark their opponents more effectively among other things. By helping themselves in one area of the pitch a team can create chances elsewhere, or elide weaknesses.

 However, this was not the case: by being pushed back, both Jermaine Pennant (who was largely ineffective going forwards, with poor deliveries from set-pieces and the rare crosses he could give, usually from deep positions rather than the byline), and Etherington (who did not have the fitness to move up the pitch and was dispossessed a number of times) were occupying the full-backs’ natural zone. Defensively, this meant that Stoke were able to play narrowly and compactly, and this is the secret of why they were able to keep the scoreline respectable.

 Meanwhile, neither Rory Delap or Glenn Whelan were able to venture far over the half-way line and dictate play, and Jonathan Walters was shackled at all times by Nigel De Jong, who had an excellent game – this, along with the fact that Walters was unsupported and left alone in the midfield triangle's tip, allowed Gareth Barry to move forward and be involved in the retention of possession rather than winning the ball. When Mancini ambitiously brought on winger Adam Johnson, the Sky Blues were able to pass and run their way through the Stoke's parked bus rather than shooting from range, which had previously been their most promising avenues of getting on the scoresheet, with typically powerful shots from Yaya Touré and De Jong.

Stoke’s best chance came from an extremely difficult one-on-one, the ball being played long from the Stoke half by Etherington. Walters was unable to provide a follow-up effort as he was in the midfield zone: that Stoke’s best chance came from a ball from their own half is symptomatic of Manchester City’s domination in terms of space, aided by Wembley’s wide pitch. In the later periods, Jones dropped back into the midfield zone with Walters so that Stoke were left effectively strikerless, which is perhaps the most damning sign of the failure to impose their shape onto their opponents – City meanwhile passed the ball well and tired the entire Stoke City team, which was already suffering with fitness issues.

Image via Vincent Teeuwen  (Britannia Stadium) at fotopedia

Let’s summarise: the lack of a specific holding midfielder, which presumably would have been Rory Delap, meant that Whelan did not have license to move forward and connect with Walters, who was man-marked out of the game by De Jong, moving fluidly around the pitch; the wingers, perhaps the most effective way of attacking with 4-4-2, were unfit and ineffective at best. Wingers are effective in this system because, with their pace they are able to make up the space between the forward bands and the flat midfield – Walters was closed as an avenue, and thus Stoke were easily dominated. Had they matched City’s formation, the 4 bands of the formation rather than the 3 of Stoke (Walters counts as one, but he was ineffective and largely played in the midfield as outlined) would have allowed them to play deep if they so wished, with counter-attacks being able to be launched quickly on the flanks from the pivots of the central midfield. The holding band would have also allowed Stoke’s silent full-backs to move forward and exploit space better. However, this was not meant to be, and ultimately Stoke were dispossessed and left chasing the ball, with their ‘determination’ unable to make up for their tactical errors, the lack of pressing and moving up the field meant that the victors were able to recycle possession. Their formation did not allow their physical style to triumph, and their long-balls were far too long to be effective.

Case Study 2: Wolves 3 – 1 West Bromwich Albion [2^nd Black Country Derby, 10-11]

Now we move onto our second case study, the second Black Country Derby from the 10/11 season. This is interesting to study because in this case, 4-4-1-1 triumphed over its more ‘modern’ 4-2-3-1 rival. There are, however, a number of reasons for this:

Firstly, Wolves pressed high up the pitch, particularly in early periods. The two decisive goals both came from defensive errors on corners; West Brom do not have the best reputation for keeping goals out from set pieces, and Wolves exploited this fully – the pressure caused by the high line and aggressive pressing directly led to these corners, which must be taken into consideration along with the rubbish penalty area defending of Albion.

Secondly, West Brom fielded an unusual side – Paul Scharner could not figure in the game because of suspension, and so James Morrison (more naturally an attacking player who can play on the wings or in the centre) deputised at defensive midfield, partnering the Congolese fans’ player-of-the-year Mulumbu. Morrison was inadequate for this role, and was probably intended to play more of a playmaking role akin to Gareth Barry above – the Wolves shape and pressing however necessitated defensive duty. Both of Wolves’ wingers had good games, and were able to outpace their opponents. The third Wolves goal came from another defensive error, this time from centre-back Abdoulaye Meite, who was caught flapping in the air and was quickly beaten by the talented forward Fletcher. Ward had an excellent game too, being involved in all areas of the pitch; some Wolves supporters have criticised Mick McCarthy for playing Ward (among others) out-of-position, but the physical drive of Ward was useful here and exploited the weak partnership of Morrison and Mulumbu. The holding partnership were often found close together, with Mulumbu tasked with winning back possession which Morrison lost – this allowed Wolves to spread across the pitch well, to dominate midfield and to put extreme pressure on the Albion defence, especially from wide positions. Whilst Kevin Foley was involved going forward, the Wolves left-back George Elokobi is not an offensively-minded player, and instead rendered Somen Tchoyi (the WBA right-winger) wasteful, who gave away the ball a number of times.

Via tony.evans (Molineux stadium) at fotopedia

Albion’s best player was probably Peter Odemwingie, who cut inside from wide positions, exploiting the channels in the Wolves back four. This caused Wolves to narrow their defence, relying on late tackles in the box – this was the reason for the penalty as West Brom built up pressure, with Odemwingie converting. This was not a totally convincing Wolves victory, with Albion wasting a number of efforts, although it must be said that Ward should have scored following some good ball control and dribbling. As Albion’s pressure mounted, Wolves were pushed back and suffered many of the same problems as Stoke City above – ultimately however their gamble to push forward in the earlier periods paid off, and they luckily did not surrender their lead, which was a common occurrence for Wolves all season against teams: taking the lead and sitting back with their ungainly formation. Whilst Albion’s formation suited defending better, Morrison’s lack of nous and the inelegant positioning of Gonzalo Jara meant that Wolves were able to dominate. The risks are there to see, but Wolves won their gamble through errors on their opponents’ part, even if they were caused by pressure, the Albion defence did not ‘turn up’ at Molineux and did not respond. Wolves’ shape was able to dominate the midfield when they chased a lead, and much like in chess he who dominates the middle of the board has a decisive advantage: when Wolves dropped back following their decisive lead, the tables turned and the roles were swapped. Had they backfired, however, they would have been susceptible to the same kind of counter-attacking which led to Fletcher’s poached goal off of Meite’s error. I can't accept the notion that McCarthy got everything right tactically outside of the periods where Wolves showed the ambition needed.

Formation diagrams made by author, other images courtesy of Creative Commons License, Fotopedia and creation